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Abstract
A dialogical version of (modal) epistemic logic is outlined, with an
intuitionistic variant. Another version of dialogical epistemic logic is then
provided by means of the S4 mapping of intuitionistic logic. Both systems
cast new light on the relationship between intuitionism, modal logic and
dialogical games.
Introduction
Two main approaches to knowledge in logic can be distinguished [1]. The first one is
an implicit way of encoding knowledge and consists in an epistemic interpretation of
usual logic. This is for instance the case of Intutionistic logics, especially of the so-
called BHK interpretation of it. There, assertion is assimilated to provability, negation
to the provability of contradiction, etc. The second approach is what is known, since
Hintikka’s seminal work [7], as (modal) epistemic logic. In this case, knowledge is
explicitely supported by modal operators.
The aim of the paper is to show the specific insight provided by dialogical games
on this distinction. In section 1, I will introduce dialogical versions of classical and
intuitionistic PL and a dialogical version of modal epistemic logic. In section 2 and 3,
two combinations of implicit and explicit epistemic logic are accounted for: Intuition-
istic modal logic, and a modal embedding of intuitionistic logic. In section 4, other
issues connected with the implementation of epistemic logic in the dialogical frame are
raised and briefly discussed.
1 Dialogical Epistemic Logic (DEL) in a Nut-
shell
Thanks to a straighforward transposition of Rahman & Ru¨ckert’s Dialogical Modal
Logic [12], one obtains a Dialogical Epistemic Logic (hereafter DEL). For that purpose,
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several kinds of rules have to be stated: structural and particle rules for propositional
logic and for modal epistemic logic. As will be shown, modal logic only requires a
simple extension of rules for propositional logic.
1.1 Propositional Logic
In a dialogical game, two players argue about a thesis: The proponent P defends
it against the attacks of the opponent O. As usually in game semantics, something
interesting appears when the proponent has a winning strategy, i.e. if she can defend
the proposition against any attack from the opponent. Here the interesting result is
that one is guaranteed that the proposition is logically true or valid – whereas with
in GTS for instance, the existence of a winning strategy means that the challenged
proposition is true simpliciter.
Particle Rules The meaning of each logical constant is given through a particle
rule which determines how to attack and defend a formula whose main connective
is the constant in question. The set, PartRules, of particle rules for disjunction,
conjunction, subjunction and negation is recapitulated in the following table:
Attack Defence
A ∨ B ? A, or B
(The defender chooses)
A ∧ B ?L, or ?R A, or B
(The attacker chooses) (respectively)
A→ B A B
¬A A ⊗
(No possible defence)
The idea for disjunction is that the proposition A ∨B, when asserted by a player,
is challenged by the question ”Which one?”; the defender has then to choose one of
the disjuncts and to defend it against any new attack. The rule is the same for the
conjunction A∧B, except that the choice is now made by the attacker: ”‘Give me the
left conjunct (?L)” or ”Give me the right one (?R)”, and the defender has to assume
the conjunct chosen by his or her challenger. For the conditional A→ B, the attacker
assumes the antecedentA and the defender continues with B. Finally negated formulas
are attacked by the cancellation of negation, and cannot be defended. The defender
in this case can thus only counterattack (if she can).
Structural Rules In addition to the particle rules connected to each logical con-
stant, one also needs structural rules to be able to play in such and such a way at the
level of the whole game.
• (PL-0) Starting Rule: The initial formula (the thesis of the dialogical game)
is asserted by P. Moves are numbered and alternatively uttered by P and O.
Each move after the initial utterance is either an attack or a defence.
• (PL-1) Winning Rule: Player X wins iff it is Y’s turn to play and Y cannot
perform any move.
• (PL-2)No Delaying Tactics Rule: Both players can only perform moves that
change the situation.
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• (PL-3) Formal Rule: (In a given context1) P cannot introduce any new atomic
formula; new atomic formulas must be stated by O first. Atomic formulas can
never be attacked.
These four rules are common to dialogical games for both classical and intuitionistic
logic. The only difference resides in the following rule:
• (PL-4c) Classical Rule: In any move, each player may attack a complex for-
mula uttered by the other player or defend him/herself against any attack (in-
cluding those that have already been defended).
• (PL-4i) Intuitionistic Rule: In any move, each player may attack a complex
formula uttered by the other player or defend him/herself against the last attack
that has not yet been defended.
Now we can build two distinct sets of rules DialPLc and DialPLi, yielding re-
spectively classical propositional logic and intuitionistic propositional logic:
DialPLc := PartRules ∪ {PL-0, PL-1, PL-2, PL-3, PL-4c}
DialPLi := PartRules ∪ {PL-0, PL-1, PL-2, PL-3, PL-4i}
This means that the difference between classical and intuitionistic logic is reducible
to the structural rule PL-4: all the other structural rules, like particle rules, are strictly
identical.
For any set of rules Σ, I will use the notation Σ  A to say that there is a winning
strategy for the proponent in the dialogical game about A played according to the
rules of Σ. As PL-4i is more constrained than PL-4c, we have for any propositional
formula: DialPLi  A ⇒ DialPLc  A.
Example 1 As a first example of a dialogical game for propositional logic, let’s
consider a formula that is valid according to both classical and intuitionistic logic:
((a → b) ∧ a) → b. In the dialogical frame, it means that there is a winning strategy
for the proponent P when she plays according to both sets of rules. The rounds and
the corresponding arguments, attacks or defences, are indicated by a number within
brackets (n) in the external columns, whereas the arguments attacked by the players
are referred to by their number n in the internal column. Defences are on the lines of
the corresponding attacks. The reader can check the following game and see what is
the winning strategy employed by P:
O P
((a→ b) ∧ a)→ b (0)
(1) (a→ b) ∧ a 0 b (8)
(3) a→ b 1 ?L (2)
(5) a 1 ?R (4)
(7) b 3 a (6)
Having stated the thesis (0), P cannot simply defend it against O’s first attack (1)
since she should assert b which is an atom not yet stated by the opponent. But P can
1In propositional logic contexts are not yet defined – this will be usefull for dialogical games
for modal logics.
3
counterattack twice, with (2) and (4), and O is forced to defend himself with (3) and
(5) respectively. Thanks to (5), P can use a at round (6) and attack O’s round (3) to
oblige him to answer b (7). Now b is available to P who can answer the first attack
and win the game (no more move being permitted for the opponent.)
Example 2 The second example is provided by the dialogical games associated to
the formula: ¬¬a → a. As can be expected, we will get DialPLc  ¬¬a → a, but
DialPLi 2 ¬¬a→ a:
O P
¬¬a→ a (0)
(1) ¬¬a 0 a (4)
⊗ 1 ¬a (2)
(3) a 2 ⊗
The difference between the games happens after round (3). Following the intu-
itionistic rule (PL-4i), the proponent should defend herself against the last attack not
yet defended, i.e. against (3); but she cannot, since (3) is an attack against a negation
leaving no available defence. By contrast, according to the classical rule, the propo-
nent can defend herself against a former attack of the opponent, so she can answer (4)
to (1), and win the game.
1.2 (Modal) Epistemic logic
As for PL, Modal Logic requires the introduction of particle and structural rules corre-
sponding to the additional operators. We will moreover need a convention to designate
the different contexts (or possible worlds) where propositions are stated by both play-
ers.
Particle Rules The thesis of the dialogue is uttered in a given context w. The
particle rules for the epistemic operator K and for its dual P enable the players to
change the context.
Attack Defence
KA ?K/w′ A
(in context w) (The attacker chooses (in context w′)
an available context w′)
PA ?P A
(in context w) (in an available context w′
chosen by the defender)
Contexts numbering
• The initial context is numbered 1. The n immediate successors of m are num-
bered m.1, m.2, . . . ,m.n.
• An immediate successor m.n of a context m is said to be of rank +1 relative
to m, and m is said to be of rank −1 relative to its immediate successors. A
successor m.n.p of a context m is said to be of rank +2 relative to m, etc.
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Structural Rules Modal structural rules correspond to restrictions on the acces-
sibility relation K between contexts (and thus determine which contexts are available
to players). The first two rules are obviously incompatible and should not be included
together in the same set of rules.2
• (ML-frc) Formal Rule for Contexts: P cannot introduce a new context; new
contexts must be introduced by O first.
• (ML-D) Axiom D rule: P can introduce a new context of rank +1 relative to
the context he is playing in.
• (ML-K) K Rule: P cannot stay in the context she is playing in (as she attacks
a formula of the form KA or defends a formula of the form PA). P can choose
a (given) context of rank +1 relative to the context she is playing in.
• (ML-T) T Rule: P can either choose a (given) context of rank +1 relative to
the context she is playing in, or stay in the context she is playing in.
• (ML-B) B Rule: P can either choose a (given) context of rank −1/+1 relative
to the context she is playing in, or stay in the context she is playing in.
• (ML-S4) S4 Rule: P can either choose any (given) context of rank +k relative
to the context she is playing in, or stay in the context she is playing in.
• (ML-S5) S5 Rule: P can choose any (given) context.
Dialogical Epistemic Systems Combining these new rules with those ofDialPLc,
one obtains sets of rules corresponding to different usual systems of propositional modal
logic:
DialK := DialPLc ∪ {ML-frc, ML-K}
DialD := DialPLc ∪ {ML-D, ML-K}
DialT := DialPLc ∪ {ML-frc, ML-T}
DialB := DialPLc ∪ {ML-frc, ML-B}
DialS4 := DialPLc ∪ {ML-frc, ML-S4}
DialS5 := DialPLc ∪ {ML-frc, ML-S5}
Example Let’s consider a substitution instance of the Positive Introspection Prop-
erty (also known as Axiom 4): Kφ→ KKφ, to be played according to DialS4. What
is interesting here is the fact that the proponent resorts to the transitivity of K at
round (6) – if the game was played in a non-transitive structure, there would be no
more winning strategy available to P.
O P
Ka→ KKa (0) 1
1 (1) Ka 0 KKa (2) 1
1 (3) ?K/1.1 2 Ka (4) 1.1
1.1 (5) ?K/1.1.1 4 a (8) 1.1.1
1.1.1 (7) a 1 ?K/1.1.1 (6) 1.1.1
2Here I follow Rahman and Ru¨ckert’s formulation of rules associated with specific modal
systems. Structural rules could also be formulated in accordance with the specific axioms
involved in those systems: the upshot would be the same.
5
2 Intuitionistic DEL
Two kinds of Intuitionistic epistemic logic can be provided using the dialogical frame.
The first one is Intuitionistic Modal Logic to be sketched in this section. The second
one is a dialogical version of the modal simulation of intuitionistic logic, to be presented
in the next section.
2.1 Intuitionistic Modal Logic
Within the Dialogical frame, Rahman & Ru¨ckert [12] suggest just to change DialPLc
into DialPLi in the set of structural rules. For instance, an intuitionistic version of
S5 is directly obtained by replacing (PL-4c) by (PL-4i): DialS5i := DialPLi ∪ {ML-
frc, ML-S5}. For any dialogical system of modal logic DialΣ, I will use the notation
DialΣi to designate the corresponding intuitionistic version obtained in this way.
Is it really intuitionistic modal logic? Such dialogical systems are obtained
through a simple combinatorial step. It can be doubted that they yield ”real” intuition-
istic modal logics. Let LM be the standard propositional language augmented by the
modal connectives in M . Wolter & Zakharyaschev’s general definition of an intuition-
istic modal logic L in LM is as follows [14]: (1) L ⊂ LM ; (2) L contains propositional
intuitionistic logic; (3) L is closed under: (i) Modus ponens, (ii) Substitution, (iii)
Regularity Rule (A→ B / ©A→©B, for every © ∈M .)
In the dialogical frame, it is easily seen that conditions (1) and (2) are automatically
filled with the relations holding between the corresponding sets of rules DialΣ and
DialΣi. Now, one can easily check that any dialogical epistemic system DialΣi is
closed under the Regularity Rule:
O P
A→ B (0) 1
1 (1) A 0 B (2) 1
... ...
A→ B is valid iff there is a winning strategy for P to end this game.
O P
KA→ KB (0) 1
1 (1) KA 0 KB (2) 1
1 (3) ?K/1.1 2 B (6) 1.1
1.1 (5) A 1 ?K/1.1 (4) 1.1
... ...
O P
PA→ PB (0) 1
1 (1) PA 0 PB (2) 1
1 (3) ?P 2 B (6) 1.1
1.1 (5) A 1 ?P (4) 1
... ...
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What follows immediately from the last two dialogues is that they are to be con-
tinued in the same way as that corresponding to A→ B. In other words: If there is a
winning strategy for P in the dialogue associated to A→ B, then there is one for the
corresponding dialogue associated to KA→ KB (or PA→ PB).
Moreoever, the dialogical system DialKi at least encompasses Fischer-Servi’s in-
tuitionistic modal logic FS, and the same for the corresponding extensions S4, S5,
and so forth. (For more details, see the Appendix.)
2.2 Application to epistemic modalities
Knowledge Generalization The necessitation rule KG (i.e. A / KA), applies
only to intuitionistic validities, not to classical ones:
O P
K(a ∨ ¬a) (0) 1
1 (1) ?K/1.1 0 (a ∨ ¬a) (2) 1.1
... ...
After (2), the play goes on (in context 1.1) according to DialPLi. Hence O wins!
Intuitionistic dialogical epistemic systems thus account for (explicit) knowledge of
intuitionist agents.
Intuitionistic K and P In intuitionistic modal systemsDialΣi, K and P become
genuine intuitionistic modal operators: they are no more interdefinable.
For instance according to DialTi (i.e. with a reflexive accessibility relation), one
can see that: ¬K¬A 6≈ PA – the following dialogue stops at round (7) –, whereas (as
is expected): ¬K¬A ≈ PA within DialT – the play goes on.
O P
¬Ka→ P¬a (0) 1
1 (1) ¬Ka 0 P¬a (2) 1
1 (3) ?P 2 ¬a (4) 1
1 (5) a 4 ⊗
⊗ 1 Ka (6) 1
1 (7) ?K/1.1 6 a (10) 1.1
(3’) ?P 2 ¬a (8) 1.1
1.1 (9) a 8 ⊗
It also can be shown that other properties of K and P still hold in DialTi, such
as the Consistency Property (D):3
3The Consistency Property is not valid according to DialKi, as can be seen at round (4):
with no reflexive accessibility relation, P cannot choose the current context to attack O’s
assertion of Ka.
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O P
Ka→ Pa (0) 1
1 (1) Ka 0 Pa (2) 1
1 (3) ?P 2 a (6) 1
1 (5) a 1 ?K/1 (4) 1
Advantages of Intuitionistic DEL To conclude this section, let’s mention a
few features of Intuitionistic DEL which make it a good tool for epistemic logic:
1. Intuitionistic DEL provides an interesting account of modalities K and P : Ig-
noring a does no longer imply considering ¬a as a possibility.
2. Implicit epistemic logic is made explicit: the intuitionist agent is described as an
intuitionist agent (thanks to the aforementioned restriction of KG to intuition-
istic valid formulas). One could change the rules of the underlying propositional
logic (e.g. for more strictly contructive ones) and obtain a corresponding explicit
epistemic version in the same straighforward manner.
3. With the intuitionistic operators K and P , not only the described agent but
his/her interpreter too is (implicitly) grasped as a cognitive agent. This may be
illustrated by the rejection of the tertium non datur: KA ∨ ¬KA, in DialS5i:
O P
Ka ∨ ¬Ka (0) 1
1 (1) ? 0 ¬Ka (2) 1
1 (3) Ka 2 ⊗
1 (5) a 3 ?K/1 (4) 1
3 Modal Simulation of Intuitionistic (non-modal)
Logic
Let’s turn again to implicit epistemic logic, namely intuitionistic propositional logic
Int. In the first section, I presented the system DialPLi which is the usual dialogical
implementation of Int. In this section, I will propose a new dialogical formulation of
intuitionistic logic, grounded on Go¨del’s 1933 S4 embedding of Int, and on Kripke’s
1965 modal semantics for Int.
Such a formulation is based on a dynamic conception of knowledge: The accessi-
bility relation between contexts corresponds to tense and to the growth of information
– in contrast to Hintikka’s 1962 ”static” conception of this relation.
3.1 Go¨del’s embedding and Kripke’s semantics
Go¨del’s translation of Int into S4 The idea of Go¨del’s embedding is closely
related to the BHK interpretation of intuitionistic logic. When a formula is known
(one could say: ‘proved’), it will persist through time. The underlying idea is that of
an always increasing knowledge, with neither memory failure nor revision. Formally,
the S4-translation AT of an intuitionistic formula A is as follows:
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aT := a for every atomic formula a
(A ∧B)T := AT ∧BT
(A ∨B)T := AT ∨BT
(¬A)T := ¬AT
(A→ B)T := (AT → BT )
It leads to the expected equivalence: Int A iff S4 A
T .
Kripke’s modal semantics for Int Kripke’s [8] structures involve a reflexive
and transitive relation ≤ between contexts. The idea is similar to Go¨del’s translation:
there is a temporal ordering of worlds, propositions being established once for all if
they are, and the same for negated propositions. So before being known, a proposition
is not true and neither is its negation.
Formally, a Kripke structure is thus a tuple K = 〈W,≤,〉, where: (1) ≤ is a
pre-ordering on W (i.e. a binary reflexive and transitive relation); (2) the forcing
relation  is such that: (2.1) For all w ∈ W , w 6 ⊥ (2.2) For all w,w′ ∈W , if w ≤ w′
and w  a, then w′  a (where a is an atomic formula). The forcing relation is then
extended to complex formulas according to the following requirements: (i) w  A∧B
iff w  A and w  B; (ii) w  A∨B iff w  A or w  B; (iii) w  A→ B iff ∀w′ ∈ W ,
if w ≤ w′ and w′  A, then w′  B; (iv) w  ¬A iff ∀w′ ∈ W , if w ≤ w′ then w′ 1 A.
Now we have the following equivalence:
Int A iff K  A for any Kripke model K.
3.2 Dialogical Simulation of Int
Can the modal simulation of Int be implemented in dialogical games? The idea is
to consider propositional intuitionistic formulas as if they were modal formulas. A
dialogical version of S4 obtains thanks to the usual structural rules. Of course, there
will be a restriction on the formulas: we reach a S4-like dialogical version for the
propositional fragment only (i.e. not for formulas including modal operators).
However, the usual S4 structural rules are not enough for this implementation:
we must take into account the non-standard interpretation of atoms, negation and
subjunction. Eventually, our system IntS4 will essentially differ from S4 at the level
of particle rules.
Atoms According to Go¨del’s translation: aT := a for every atomic formula a.
Let’s consider the following part of game involving a and played with DialS4:
O P
m (j) a ...
... ...
a (k) n
n (k+1) ?/n.1 k a (k+4) n.1
n.1 (k+3) a j ?/n.1 (k+2) m
... ...
Player P can defend her assertion of a only if a has been previously introduced
by O in any contextm ≤ n (thanks to the transitivity of ≤ in S4). So (S4 translations
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of) Int atoms can be attacked since they are modal formulas. We should thus add
a special particle rule for atoms in IntS4, stating that if an atom a is asserted in
a context m, then it can be attacked by ?n where the attacker chooses an available
context n ≥ m, and defended by the assertion of a in the context n. Correlatively,
the formal rule (PL-3) should be modified to enable players to attack atomic formulas.
We would get the following structural rule.
But we do not need to change the particle rule for atomic formula. A simple look
at the situation makes it clear that the whole modification can be restricted to one
structural rule:
• (PL-3*) IntS4 Formal Rule: In a given context n P cannot introduce any
new atomic formula that has not been introduced by O in any context m ≤ n;
new atomic formulas must be stated by O first. Atomic formulas can never be
attacked.
Negation Go¨del’s translation (¬A)T := ¬AT indicates that a negated formula
asserted in a context m can be challenged in any context n ≥ m:
O P
... ...
¬A (k) n
n (k+1) ?/n.1 k ¬A (k+2) n.1
n.1 (k+3) A k+2 ⊗
... ...
This leads naturally to the following Particle rule for negation in IntS4:
Attack Defence
¬A A ⊗
(in context m) (in an available context n ≥ m
chosen by the attacker)
Implication The case of implication (A→ B)T := (AT → BT ) is similar to that
of negation:
O P
... ...
(A→ B) (k) n
n (k+1) ?/n.1 k A→ B (k+2) n.1
n.1 (k+3) A k+2 B (k+4) n.1
... ...
It leads to the following modified Particle rule in IntS4:
Attack Defence
A→ B A B
(in context m) (The attacker chooses (in context n)
an available context n ≥ m)
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Recapitulation To sum up our new system, let’s denote the new set of particle
rules by PartRulesS4: it is thus identical to PartRules concerning conjunction and
disjunction, and differs on subjunction and negation.
Now we get a new set of rules:
IntS4 := PartRulesS4 ∪ { PL-0, PL-1, PL-2, PL-3*, PL-4c} ∪ {ML-frc, ML-S4}
which is equivalent to DialPLi in the following sense:
IntS4  A ⇔ DialPLi  A
for any propositional formula A.
Example 1 IntS4 2 a ∨ ¬a
O P
a ∨ ¬a (0) 1
1 (1) ? 0 ¬a (2) 1
1.1 (3) a 2 ⊗
Example 2 IntS4  ¬¬(a ∨ ¬a)
O P
¬¬(a ∨ ¬a) (0) 1
1.1 (1) ¬(a ∨ ¬a) 0 ⊗
⊗ 1 a ∨ ¬a (2) 1.1
1.1 (3) ? 2 ¬a (4) 1.1
1.1.1 (5) a 4 ⊗
⊗ 1 a ∨ ¬a (6) 1.1.1
1.1.1 (7) ? 6 a (8) 1.1.1
4 Discussion
In Game-Theoretical Semantics (GTS), one can distinguish between two types of
”knowledge” depending on whether one is concerned about the interpretation of the
epistemic operators (i.e. the usual meaning of ”knowledge”) or about the knowledge of
the players of evaluation games. Van Benthem [2] strongly stresses the epistemic fea-
tures involved in GTS and IF Logic, even though such an interpretation of imperfect
information games is absent from Hintikka’s original creation.
A similar distinction can be made in the dialogical frame, between explicit knowl-
edge (that is embedded in the operators) and implicit knowledge (of the players).
However, the distinction is not exactly the same since the players of dialogical games
are not assumed to have particular information sets at their diposal, but a set of action
rules. The intuitionistic restriction (PL-4i) imposed on the set of classical rules for
PL therefore leads to a modelling of an abstract agent with limited (i.e. intuitionistic)
epistemic powers.
In the above sections, two competing accounts of knowledge using dialogical games
are provided. The two implementations resort to both implicit and explicit knowledge.
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They consist in specific combinations of intuitionistic and modal logics. Whereas
systems DialΣi innoculate an intuitionistic variation to standard dialogical systems
of modal logic, IntS4 (implicitely) involves a modal interpretation of intuitionistic
logic.
The two approaches presented in this paper could be extended in several ways.
Among the possible developments of what should be called in general Dialogical Epis-
temic Logic, we highlight the following:
1. As was already stressed, IntS4 is only concerned with the propositional frag-
ment of S4. One could easily consider modal extensions IntS4K of it, using the
underlying Kripke-like modal structure, and consider assertions about the S4-
knowledge of an intuitionistic agent, such as e.g.: ¬K(a ∨ ¬a).
2. Dialogical systems of doxastic logic, e.g. the system DialKD45. Doxastic logic
in the dialogical frame starts like a nice story. The structural rule (ML-D) which
separates the logic of belief from the logic of knowledge specifically enables the
proponent to create new contexts... In doxastic logic too, intuitionistic variations
could be easily implemented.
3. Multi-agent epistemic logic: such a development would be naturally grou-nded
in multi-modal dialogical logic.
4. Non-Normal Logics. These ”deviant”modal logics are due to Lemmon 1957 and
Kripke 1965. They are based on the rejection of the axiom K and/or of the
Necessitation Rule (KG in epistemic logic: A/KA). A motivation for adopting
such a logic is to escape logical omniscience. Several authors have supplied
epistemic logics using non-normal logic:
• Duc [5] uses normal action modalities and non-normal epistemic modali-
ties, where KG is replaced by: A/〈Fi〉KA, 〈Fi〉 being a dynamic action-
temporal modality;
• Thomason’s theory [13] is a combination of a normal (KD45) multi-agent
frame and of a non-normal (E2) intra-agent frame (between subagents).
Rahman and Keiff’s recent proposal of a dialogical implementation of non-
normal logics ([10], [11]) leads to an immediate epistemic interpretation. Their
main idea consists in considering a kind of meta-modal logic, i.e. a frame in
which it is possible to consider different modal systems together. For example,
an intuitionist logician might want to consider the (possible) case where tertium
non datur were valid in his or her logic: the case in question amounts to a con-
text where another logic is assumed to hold. Transposing it to epistemic logic
enables one to consider the following cases:
• Standard interpretation of a deviant agent in multi-modal epistemic logic,
e.g. KiKjA where agent the j is crazy and the agent i is sane;
• Deviant interpretations of standard epistemic agents;
• Shifting positive introspection (this is made by a crazy agent who knows
he or she is crazy, like in Ksanei K
crazy
i A.)
Let’s give a quick illustration of this non-normal frame with the dialogical game
of the formula KcKi(a∨¬a) – stating that one knows classically that she knows
intuitionistically that a or not a, which is surely false. This is established ac-
cording to S0.5:
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O P
KK(a ∨ ¬a) (0) 1-PLc
1-PLc (1) ?K/1.1 0 K(a ∨ ¬a) (2) 1.1-PLc
1.1-PLc (3) ?K/1.1.1−PLi 2 a ∨ ¬a (4) 1.1.1-PLi
1.1.1-PLi (5) ? 4 ¬a (6) 1.1.1-PLi
1.1.1-PLi (7) a 6 ⊗
(An underlying logic, here DialPLc or DialPLi, is associated to each context.
For explanations of such dialogues, see the quoted papers.)
Conclusion
The original formulation of dialogical logic by Lorenzen and Lorenz [9] was strongly
related to intuitionistic logic. However, this connection may be enriched as is shown
by our implementation of Go¨del’s S4 embedding of Int. With the system IntS4 one
gets a new version of intuitionistic logic where the interpretation is directly linked to
the connectives, at the level of the particle rules – like in the BHK interpretation.
In this paper I have sketched two systems of epistemic logic, conceptually very
different but implementationally very close. While presenting systems DialΣi, we
have seen that genuine intuitionistic modal logics resulted easily. However, lots of
perspectives in the field of dialogical epistemic logic go far beyond the scope of this
paper, as for instance the exact delimitation of such systems, extensions to multi-modal
logics or to non-normal systems.
A new insight on the relationship between intuitionistic and modal logics has been
provided by dialogical logic. It is at least a confirmation of the fecondity of dialogical
logic as a frame to compare logical theories.
Appendix: Dialogical games and intuitionistic ML
DialKi and (FS) DialKi appears to be at least equivalent to the well-known
system of intuitionistic modal logic due to Fischer-Servi (FS): the axioms of (FS)
are all valid according to the dialogical set of rules DialKi. This is shown through
dialogical games; a real proof would require a demonstration exhibiting every possible
strategy for the opponent – this can be accomplished with Beth-Smullyan-like tableaux,
where formulas are prefixed with the name of the player, P or O. (See [6] and [12] for
details.)
The set of axioms of FS is the union of IntK (the extention of propositional Int
with the standard modal axioms K for ), IntK♦ (the same except that the standard
modal axioms K are given for ♦), and two specific axioms (see [3], [14]). We will need
to add the symbol ⊥ as a prime formula, and define ¬ and ⊤ with it. Particle rules
for ⊥ and ⊤ immediately follow from these definitions:
• ¬A := A→ ⊥, so ⊥ can never be stated (if it could, negation would be defensi-
ble);
• ⊤ := ¬⊥, so ⊤ can be stated by any player in any context (it is not an atomic
formula) and it cannot be attacked.
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In what follows, the games corresponding to each axiom are written down without
comment. Every game is won by player P, according to some winning stragegy. So
for every axiom A of FS, we get: DialKi  A.
IntK : Int, ⊤, (a ∧ b)↔ (a ∧b).
O P
⊤ (0) 1
1 (1) ?/1.1 0 ⊤ (2) 1.1
O P
(a ∧ b)→ (a ∧b) (0) 1
1 (1) (a ∧ b) 0 a ∧b (2) 1
1 (3) ?L 2 a (4) 1
1 (5) ?/1.1 4 a (10) 1.1
1.1 (7) a ∧ b 1 ?/1.1 (6) 1
1.1 (9) a 7 ?L (8) 1.1
O P
(a ∧ b)→ (a ∧ b) (0) 1
1 (1) a ∧b 0 (a ∧ b) (2) 1
1 (3) ?/1.1 2 a ∧ b (4) 1.1
1.1 (5) ?L 4 a (10) 1.1
1 (7) a 1 ?L (6) 1
1.1 (9) a 7 ?/1.1 (8) 1
IntK♦ : Int, ¬♦⊥, ♦(a ∨ b)↔ (♦a ∨ ♦b)
O P
¬♦⊥ (0) 1
1 (1) ♦⊥ 0 ⊗
⊗ 1 ?♦ (2) 1
O P
♦(a ∨ b)→ (♦a ∨ ♦b) (0) 1
1 (1) ♦(a ∨ b) 0 ♦a ∨ ♦b (2) 1
1 (3) ? 2 ♦a (8) 1
1.1 (5) a ∨ b 1 ?♦ (4) 1
1.1 (7) a 5 ? (6) 1.1
1 (9) ?♦ 8 a (10) 1.1
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O P
(♦a ∨ ♦b)→ ♦(a ∨ b) (0) 1
1 (1) ♦a ∨ ♦b 0 ♦(a ∨ b) (2) 1
1 (3) ?♦ 2 a ∨ b (8) 1.1
1 (5) ♦a 1 ? (4) 1
1.1 (7) a 5 ?♦ (6) 1
1.1 (9) ? 8 a (10) 1.1
FS specific axioms: ♦(a→ b)→ (a→ ♦b), (♦a→ b)→ (a→ b).
O P
♦(a→ b)→ (a→ ♦b) (0) 1
1 (1) ♦(a→ b) 0 a→ ♦b (2) 1
1 (3) a 2 ♦b (4) 1
1 (5) ?♦ 4 b (12) 1.1
1.1 (7) a→ b 1 ?♦ (6) 1.1
1.1 (9) a 3 ?/1.1 (8) 1
1.1 (11) b 7 a (10) 1.1
O P
(♦a→ b)→ (a→ b) (0) 1
1 (1) ♦a→ b 0 (a→ b) (2) 1
1 (3) ?/1.1 2 a→ b (4) 1.1
1.1 (5) a 4 b (10) 1.1
1 (7) b 1 ♦a (6) 1
1.1 (9) b 7 ?/1.1 (8) 1
1 (11) ?♦ 6 a (12) 1.1
DialKi 6= DialK This can be shown with the following game, played according to
both sets of rules. With the intuitionistic version the proponent cannot answer to (9)
and loses, whereas with the standard ones, she can go further and revise her defence
against (3). Hence DialK  (a∨b)→ (a∨♦b) but DialKi 2 (a∨b)→ (a∨♦b).
O P
(a ∨ b)→ (a ∨ ♦b) (0) 1
1 (1) (a ∨ b) 0 a ∨ ♦b (2) 1
1 (3) ? 2 a (4) 1
1 (5) ?/1.1 4
1.1 (7) a ∨ b 1 ?/1.1 (6) 1
1.1 (9) b 7 ? (8) 1.1
1 (3’) ? 2 ♦b (10) 1
1 (11) ?♦ 10 b (12) 1.1
(Here (3’) is not a move but a repetition of (3) to let the reader see the attack the
proponent answers to at round (10).)
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